Hydrocarbon flows through the Strait of Hormuz are showing signs of recovery, but energy trade is not yet operating under normal conditions. Gulf producers’ crude exports have increased as ships resumed using the strait. In September, 19 LNG cargoes from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates reportedly also transited, more than in previous months since the conflict began. This improvement remains partial, fragile and highly exposed to changes in regional security.
Headline figures may suggest a return to normal even though different products are following different paths. Crude oil exports have recovered faster than refined product flows, particularly diesel. LNG cargoes remain well below their usual pre-crisis pace, and routes are closely monitored. Ships, insurers and buyers must factor in the risks of delays, diversions or interruptions.
A stronger recovery for crude than refined products
Shipping tracking data indicate that non-Iranian crude outflows averaged around 13.5 million barrels per day over a seven-day period in late September. This approaches the pace observed before the disruptions, but does not necessarily represent all available volumes or a risk-free reopening. Exports may also be redirected through ports and pipelines that partly bypass the strait.
Refined products remain more constrained. Diesel flows are particularly important for economies relying on this fuel for transport, agriculture, power generation and industry. A crude cargo cannot instantly replace a ready-to-use diesel shipment. Refining capacity, stocks, suitable vessels and supply contracts are needed. The crisis has thus revealed that energy security depends as much on available products as on the total volume of oil extracted.
Importing countries have diversified routes and used emergency stocks, while regional producers are seeking to bring cargoes back to markets. Alternative routes improve resilience but entail additional costs and delays. Pipelines to the Red Sea or Gulf of Oman cannot always absorb all volumes normally exported through Hormuz.
LNG returns in stages
The transit of 19 LNG cargoes from Qatar and the Emirates in September marks a notable recovery, but the figure needs context. Before the crisis, these countries regularly shipped liquefied gas to Asia, Europe and other markets. Recent observed cargo numbers remain limited compared with these usual flows. They indicate that some movements are becoming possible again, rather than that the export chain has regained normal capacity.
LNG exports are particularly sensitive to security constraints. LNG carriers are specialised vessels whose routes and loading operations are planned weeks in advance. Contracts can be redirected or renegotiated, but disruption in the strait destabilises supplier and customer portfolios. Asian buyers heavily dependent on Gulf LNG must then weigh alternative cargoes, gas savings and use of stocks.
Recovery also depends on insurance conditions, possible escorts and vessel operators’ decisions. One LNG carrier’s passage does not mean every company is ready to resume operations. Risks to crews, assets and delivery schedules remain until the military situation and transit arrangements are clarified.
Commercial normalisation remains incomplete
The market responds not only to shipped volumes but also to predictability. Importers need to know whether announced cargoes will arrive on time and flows will remain regular enough to avoid another price surge. Shipowners consider delays and insurance premiums, while suppliers seek to avoid exposing crews to risks deemed unacceptable.
Strategic stocks acted as a buffer during the most strained periods. The IEA estimates that several hundred million barrels were released through coordinated action, easing part of the immediate shortfall. This capacity does not apply in the same way to LNG or every refined product. Replenishing stocks and restarting commercial channels remain necessary for lasting market stability.
The Hormuz situation also shows the limits of relying on one indicator. Crude may return close to its earlier benchmark while diesel, LNG or maritime freight remain disrupted. Volumes by product, loading locations, alternative routes and delivery schedules must be tracked to assess the true recovery.
Buyers must account for lasting risk
For Gulf producers, the priority is to restore reliable exports without losing market share to more distant suppliers perceived as less risky. For importing countries, the crisis strengthens the case for diversifying sources, improving energy efficiency and maintaining suitable stocks. Energy companies must review force majeure clauses, insurance and transport contract flexibility.
Resuming volumes will not erase the economic consequences of disruption. Diverted cargoes cost more, stocks have been drawn down and refineries have had to adjust operations. Prices may remain volatile even after a partial restart, particularly if demand is strong or infrastructure damaged.
The recovery in oil and gas flows at Hormuz is therefore a positive signal, but a return to full commercial security depends on regular passages, normalised insurance and recovery in refined products. The strait remains a strategic chokepoint where geopolitical risk quickly transmits to global markets. For importers, the best response is a combination of diversification, stocks and reduced exposure to a single route.